نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری، گروه مطالعات راهبردی، وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری، تهران، ایران
2 گروه مطالعات راهبردی، وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This study investigates the transformation of economic corruption patterns in Iran following the intensification of international sanctions and its implications for economic security. Employing a qualitative approach and grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin's structured version), the research was conducted through semi-structured interviews with 30 experts in the field of economic corruption. Purposive sampling with snowball strategy was employed until theoretical saturation was achieved. Data analysis was performed using MAXQDA software through three stages of open, axial, and selective coding. The findings reveal that the intensification of international sanctions has served as the most significant causal condition for the transformation of corruption patterns from active to passive. This transformation occurs through four causal mechanisms: income shocks, reduced foreign currency revenues, expansion of rent-seeking markets, and increased economic uncertainty. The core phenomenon identified is "the shift from active to passive corruption and the formation of a new destructive equilibrium." The decline in active corruption (bribery, embezzlement) has been compensated by an increase in passive corruption (organized omission, deliberate underperformance, avoidance of decision-making). Economic and administrative actors have adopted dual strategies: "resorting to active corruption to overcome limitations" and "passive action to minimize risk." The research demonstrates that the shift from active to passive corruption threatens economic security through five main mechanisms: market disruption, reduction in domestic and foreign investment, capital flight, closure of production units, and weakening of public trust. The core theory is that intensification of sanctions, through creating economic constraints and pressure on state institutions, leads to a transformation of corruption patterns from active to passive, which in turn threatens the country's economic security. The research also highlights the lack of statistical transparency in the field of corruption. Effective counteraction requires strong political will, amending ambiguous laws, strengthening supervisory institutions, and increasing transparency and public awareness.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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